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I. INTRODUCTION
In the climactic final moments of many a James Bond film, 007 or one of
his associates inadvertently triggers a time bomb, and Bond must race against
time and circumstance to escape the crisis alive. With a little less panache,
state court litigants face a similar time bomb, the expiration of which is fatal to
federal removal jurisdiction. And while James will always live to fight another
day, determining exactly when this legal time bomb is triggered defines which
of the judicial actors will survive the removal countdown.
The federal removal triggers are codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).' While
the first paragraph of § 1446(b) addresses causes of action that were originally
removable at the time of filing, the second paragraph provides for removal
where the action is one that "is or has become removable" at some point fol-
lowing commencement of the original action.2 This second paragraph envi-
sions several vehicles by which an action might become removable, and
thereby portend to vest a federal district court with proper jurisdiction, namely
"by amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper."3 In addition to defining
these possible removal "triggers," the statute also mandates that such removal
occur within a period of thirty days - our time bomb - once removal becomes
an option.4
In analyzing removal situations involving the statutory triggers, federal district
courts have struggled to define the exact moment when the thirty-day clock
begins to tick after amendment of the original complaint makes an action
removable. With such a commonplace activity as amendment, one would
expect case law to be well settled on the subject; however, due to legislative
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' 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b) (West 2003) directly addresses what triggers removal and the tim-
ing requirements of such removal. The codification of other aspects of removal may be
found at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1441-1447 (West 2003).
2 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b) (West 2003).
3 Id.
4 Id.
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restraints on the removal process, 5 appellate review of removal has been scant
at best, especially as to § 1446(b)'s second paragraph.6 Given that there has
been only a single federal appellate court decision to address the second para-
graph's amendment triggers,7 federal district courts have been largely left to
their own judgment, resulting in a makeshift body of federal district-level case
law on the subject.
Currently, the federal district courts that have reviewed this timing issue
take one of three approaches to its resolution.8 First, a large minority of district
courts holds that mere delivery of the motion to amend triggers the thirty-day
clock. Next, a majority of courts triggers the thirty-day clock at the moment
the state court grants the requested permission to amend. And finally, a small
minority of courts triggers the thirty-day clock only upon the defendant's
receipt of communication from the state court which indicates the complaint
has been amended and the amended complaint has been annexed to the state
court's record. This note will first argue that the large minority's position on
this issue is a flagrant violation of the sovereignty of the state courts, an illogi-
cal reading of the statute, and is at odds with traditional removal jurisprudence.
Second, the majority's approach does not adequately conserve judicial
resources and is a textually inaccurate read of the statute. Third, the position of
the small minority is most consonant with the plain language of and original
legislative intent behind § 1446(b), is most respectful of state sovereignty as
represented by the state judiciary, and is the most efficient judicial process of
the three alternatives.
II. HISTORY OF FEDERAL REMOVAL AND § 1446(b)
Federal removal jurisdiction has existed without interruption since the fed-
eral court's inception in 1789, 9 while a sporadic and non-uniform body of fed-
5 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(d) (West 2003) ("An order remanding a case to the State court from
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise .... ).
6 The Supreme Court has recently clarified a half-century of confusion as to the trigger of
§ 1446(b)'s first paragraph; see Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526
U.S. 344 (1999).
7 See Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092 (7th Cir. 1998).
8 After researching the caselaw, it is the author's opinion that the relative sizes of the differ-
ent positions on the issue are open to debate. However, the district courts themselves make
reference to this size distribution, and for purposes of this paper, they will be assumed. See,
e.g., Finley v. Higbee Co., I F. Supp. 2d 701 (N.D. Ohio 1998):
Webster (thirty-day removal period commenced to run from the time defendants first received
the motion to amend) represents the minority position. The majority of courts have held that the
time for removal under [§ 1446(b)] begins to run not from the time a plaintiff files a motion to
amend her complaint, but from the time the motion to amend the complaint is actually granted
... Some courts have gone even further and stated that the time for removal does not begin to
run from the date the state court grants the motion to amend, but instead runs from the date the
amended complaint is filed and served.
Id. at 704.
9 See, e.g., Jerry Meade, Death of the Receipt Rule: Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe
Stringing, Inc., 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 493, 495-96 (2000) ("Congress originally provided for
removal jurisdiction when it passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, which was subsequently rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court as an appropriate exercise of congressional power.").
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eral removal case law developed between 1789 and 1911.10 The federal
removal requirements were liberalized briefly during Reconstruction, in order
to accommodate the resurrected federal question jurisdiction, before being
reined back in under an 1887 statute. I1
Congress' first attempt at broader codification of the removal process
came in the form of the Judicial Code of 1911.12 The Code's strictures contin-
ued the earlier practice of triggering a defendant's removal period according to
state trial court filing dates.' 3 In addition, a defendant desiring to remove to
federal court filed the removal petition with the state court, which then deter-
mined if removal was appropriate, though the ultimate decision regarding per-
mission to remove was vested in the federal district court.
1 4
As part of a comprehensive revision of federal procedure, the 1948 Con-
gress streamlined federal removal within 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1447. Section
1446(b) allowed a defendant to remove an action originally removable within
"twenty days after commencement of the action or service of process, which-
ever is later."' 5 Prior to 1948's codification, 160 years' worth of removal pro-
cedure had developed into an unruly body of law that was considered
"piecemeal" and disjointed, an indictment that included the 1911 congressional
effort;' 6 Congress intended that § 1446 "[make] uniform the time for filing
petitions to remove" and "give adequate time [to remove] and operate uni-
formly throughout the federal jurisdiction.""'' It should be briefly noted here
that § 1446(b)'s second paragraph was not enacted until the following year,
when the statute was amended.
"t See S.L.P., State-Federal Court Conflicts Over the Removability of Causes: The Prospect
Under the New Judicial Code, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 80 (1949). See also Michael G. Collins,
The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71 IOWA L. REv. 717 (1986).
11 Federal question jurisdiction was created in the Federalist-era Judiciary Act of 1801, but
was rescinded the year following its passage by the Congress of Jefferson's Republican
Revolution. See generally Collins, supra note 10. The 1875 reintroduction of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction was facilitated, in large part, by relaxed removal requirements. However,
due to a rising calendar backlog and cooler heads in Washington, Congress restricted
removal's availability in its 1887 revision of removal law. See Thomas R. Hrdlick, Appel-
late Review of Remand Orders in Removed Cases: Are They Losing a Certain Appeal?, 82
MARQ. L. REV. 535 (1999).
12 Judicial Code § 29 (1911) (known as the "general removal procedure statute").
13 Under the 1911 statute, removal was allowed "at any time before the defendant is
required by the laws of the State or the rule of the State court in which suit is brought to
answer or plead to the declaration or complaint of the plaintiff." Judicial Code § 29 (1911).
14 See S.L.P., supra note 10, at 81-82:
If the state court decided that the removal statute had not been complied with, it was not
required to allow removal or to stay proceedings . . . But no action of the state court could
deprive the petitioner of his right to an independent decision of the question by the federal court.
Notwithstanding the state court's refusal to stay proceedings, the defendant could file the record
in federal court, and force the plaintiff to appear there, at least for the purpose of moving to
remand the case to the state court, to avoid dismissal for want of prosecution.
'5 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b) (West 2003) (emphasis added).
16 See Robert L. Wills & Ralph E. Boyer, Proposed Changes in Federal Removal Jurisdic-
tion and Procedure, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 256 (1948) ("Much of the confusion concerning
removal results from the fact that the removal statutes have been amended in piece-meal
fashion, and have not been integrated into one coherent scheme.").
"7 Revision Notes, 1948 Act, in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b) (West 2003).
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In the year following the 1948 enactment, litigants in several states
reported timing disparities i the removal statute's operation, resulting in what
became known as "the New York" and "Kentucky" problems.' 8 In some
states, local rules permitted a plaintiff to commence an action by serving a
defendant with a summons but not the complaint;' 9 some of these states also
allowed the plaintiff to file the complaint in the state court at some point after
service of summons on a defendant.2" These local approaches resulted in the
possibility that the statutory removal period (triggered by service of summons)
could expire before a complaint had ever been filed in state court, thereby frus-
trating a defendant's opportunity to possess the complaint and determine
whether removal is available before the removal clock had run.2 ' To ensure
that the defendant's access to the complaint was preserved, Congress amended
the original statute in 1949, triggering the twenty-day clock to run on either
"receipt" of the original pleading, or service of summons if the complaint had
been previously filed in court, whichever period is shorter.22
Most relevant for the purposes of this note, Congress added a second para-
graph to § 1446(b) in its 1949 amendment, providing for removal where the
cause as stated in the initial pleading was not removable but had subsequently
become so. 23 Congress limited the removal period in this second paragraph to
twenty days from the moment that the cause became removable, pairing the
clock with that of § 1446(b)'s first paragraph.24 Congress set the removal
period to trigger upon "receipt by defendant, through service or otherwise, of a
copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may
first be ascertained that the case is [or] has become removable. 25
In adding § 1446(b)'s second paragraph, Congress declared that it
"intended to make clear that the right of removal may be exercised at a later
stage of the case if the initial pleading does not state a removable case but its
removability is subsequently disclosed."'26  Congress then stated that this
amendment was declaratory of the existing rule, and cited to Powers v. Chesa-
peake & 0. Railway Co.,27 an 1898 Supreme Court case. In Powers, the state
18 H.R. REP. No. 352, at 14 (1949).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 This problem arose, in part, because of the 1948 codification's innovations with the
removal period. Prior to 1948, the removal clock was triggered in accordance with state
rules on service of process. See sipra note 13.
22 See S. REP. No. 303, at 6 (1949):
In some States suits are begun by the service of summons or other process without the
necessity of filing any pleading until later. As the section now stands, this places the defendant
in the position of having to take steps to remove a suit to the Federal Court before he knows what
the suit is about. As said section is herein proposed to be rewritten, a defendant is not required to
file his petition for removal until 20 days after he has received (or it has been made available to
him) a copy of the initial pleading filed by the plaintiff setting forth the claim upon which the
suit is based and the relief prayed for. It is believed that this will meet the varying conditions of
practice in all States.
23 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1949).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Revision Notes, 1949 Act, in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b) (West 2003).
27 169 U.S. 92 (1898).
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trial court allowed the plaintiff to amend his complaint and dismiss a non-
diverse defendant, thereby creating diversity between the remaining defendant
and plaintiff for the first time since the action was begun. On appeal, the
Supreme Court held that in such an instance, removal was an appropriate
option for the defendant, since grounds for removal had arisen subsequent to
the suit's initiation. By amending § 1446(b), Congress affirmed the Court-
sanctioned judicial practice of allowing removal where the complaint was not
originally removable, but added the innovation of a statutory clock restricting
the period in which a defendant might exercise that removal.28
In 1965, Congress amended § 1446 once more, increasing the removal
period from twenty to thirty days.2 9 Congress' avowed purpose behind this
amendment was to ensure that defendants have an adequate period of time
within which to investigate the plaintiffs complaint and determine if valid
grounds for removal exist.30 Again, as with the 1949 amendment, Congress
paired the removal periods of § 1446(b)'s first and second paragraphs.
Finally, in a continued effort to improve judicial efficiency, Congress
amended § 1446(b)'s second paragraph in 1988, prohibiting a defendant from
removing on the basis of diversity jurisdiction where more than one year had
transpired since the commencement of the action. Congress imposed the one-
year limitation on removal because it wished to avoid the "substantial delay and
disruption" that occurs when an action is removed late in litigation. 3'
28 While § 1446(b)'s second paragraph is a significant boon for the defendant, the time limi-
tation imposed by Congress on removal clearly attempts to balance this benefit with the
concerns of both the plaintiff and the courts, state and federal. See, e.g., Wilson v. Intercol-
legiate (Big Ten) Conference Athletic Ass'n, 668 F.2d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1982):
The purpose of the 30-day limitation is twofold: to deprive the defendant of the undeserved
tactical advantage that he would have if he could wait and see how he was faring in state court
before deciding whether to remove the case to another court system; and to prevent the delay and
waste of resources involved in starting a case over in a second court after significant proceed-
ings, extending over months or even years, may have taken place in the first court.
However, this also works to the defendant's advantage in the sense that it objectifies the
removal clock's triggers, thereby creating certainty; see, e.g., Haun v. Retail Credit Co., 420
F. Supp. 859, 863 (W.D. Pa. 1976) ("The purpose of § 1446(b) is to provide a uniform and
definite time for a defendant to remove an action").
29 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1965).
30 See S. REP. No. 712, at 2 (1965): "the existing 20-day period for filing a petition for the
removal of a civil action from a State court to a Federal court is too short to permit the
removal of many actions as to which valid grounds of removal exist." In a letter from the
Department of Justice, included in the Senate's report, Deputy A.G. Katzenbach noted that
the removal period's short fuse posed a formidable obstacle to the government's defense of
actions against its representatives:
Complaints in State courts against officers and employees of the Federal Government often
allege facts which are insufficient to show that the acts complained of were under color of office
and thereby removable ... The present 20-day period does not allow sufficient time for investi-
gation by the defendant and, accordingly, there are an unnecessarily large number of remands
from the Federal courts back to the State courts ... the additional 10 days would be most helpful.
Id. at 3. Such endemic removal problems would seem to apply equally to § 1446(b)'s first
and second paragraphs.
31 H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 72 (1988):
Subsection (b)(2) amends 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) to establish a one-year limit on removal based on
diversity jurisdiction as a means of reducing the opportunity for removal after substantial pro-
[Vol. 4:120
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It is important to note that, in each of these stages of federal removal's
development, Congress has sought to give the defendant adequate notice of the
possibility of removal to federal court and to promote judicial efficiency in the
removal process itself.3" These two concerns address some of the most funda-
mental criticisms and aspirations that have characterized the federal judiciary as
an institution. From their conception, the federal courts have been championed
as impartial forums, "free" from the biases, real or perceived, extant in the state
court systems. 33 Indeed, some of the federal court's harshest critics have his-
torically been states' rights advocates, alleging federal intrusion into the states'
authority and operation.34 In addition, critics of the federal courts have
asserted that the forum is an exorbitant and unnecessary luxury for litigants
who already possess unfettered access to state courts. 35 Against this backdrop
gress has been made in state court ... Removal late in the proceedings may result in substantial
delay and disruption.
For criticism of the amendment, see George D. Billinson, Recent Amendments to the
Removal Statute - Judicial Disimprovements and Inaccess, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1145,
1157 (1989) ("Simply stated, amended section 1446(b) is a bad law. It will destroy the
defendant's right to a federal forum in many cases. It will foster shrewd trial tactics by
plaintiffs while at the same time punishing innocent defendants. Furthermore, the amend-
ment is inconsistent with established federal precedent and other removal provisions.").
32 See S. REP. No. 712, at 2 (1965).
[A] subcommittee of the Judicial Conference ... concluded that the existing 20-day period for
filing a petition for the removal of a civil action from a State court to a Federal court is too short
to permit the removal of many actions as to which valid grounds of removal exist."
See also H.R. REP. No. 100-889, supra note 31.
33 See, e.g., Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34 (1883) ("The very object of giving to the
national courts jurisdiction to administer the laws of the states in controversies between
citizens of different states was to institute independent tribunals, which, it might be sup-
posed, would be unaffected by local prejudices and sectional views.").
3' For example, Professor Bourguignon describes the objections of Brutus, the anonymous
Anti-Federalist voice during the Constitution's ratification, to the federal judiciary: "Brutus
believed the new federal judiciary would be the chief instrument of the states' destruction.
'Nothing could have been better conceived to facilitate the abolition of the state governments
than the constitution of the judicial.'" Henry J. Bourguignon, The Federal Key to the Judici-
ary Act of 1789, 46 S.C. L. Rav. 647, 666 (1995). Brutus's misgivings were alive and well
in the first Congress. On the second day of debate in the House on the Judiciary bill, Repre-
sentative Livermore moved to strike the creation of a Supreme Court entirely. He then
stated:
I fear this principle of establishing judges of a supreme court will lead to an entire new system of
jurisprudence, and fill every state in the union with two kinds of courts for the trial of many
causes, a thing so heterogeneous, must give great disgust: Sir, it will be establishing a govern-
ment within a government, and one must prevail upon the ruin of the other.
11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791: DEBATE IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES - FIRST SESSION 1330 (Kenneth R. Bowling et al. eds., 1992).
Livermore went on to argue that the Constitution did not necessitate a Supreme Court at all,
and argued against an expensive federal judiciary. Id. at 1330-32. He concluded his
remarks by stating, ..... I contemplate with horror the effects of the [proposed judiciary]; I
think I see a foundation laid for discord, civil wars, and all its concomitants." Id. at 1332.
35 For example, Senator Maclay, an Anti-Federalist member of the committee assigned to
draft the Judiciary Act in the first Congress, was strongly opposed to the creation of inferior
federal courts on the basis of their cost and interference with local government. Speaking of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, he wrote:
I opposed this bill from the beginning. It certainly is a Vile law System, calculated for Expense,
and with a design to draw by degrees all law business into the federal Courts. The Constitution
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of financial and procedural concerns, Congress has molded its federal removal
statutes, attempting both to preserve the federal forum for qualifying defend-
ants and to streamline the judicial process to avoid duplicative, time-consuming
procedure.
Also in response to such concerns, Congress codified the common law
tradition of limiting review of the removal procedure.3 6 Section 1447(d), sister
legislation to § 1446, proscribes appellate review of the federal district court's
decision to remand for improper removal, while leaving appellate courts free to
review removal where upheld by a district court.3 7 In addition to promoting
more frequent remand of removal petitions, the practical effect of § 1447(d)'s
scruples has been to greatly truncate appellate law on the issue, given that one
side of the argument has been silenced by Congress. With the appellate court
voice all but muted on the issue, this note proceeds to the largely district-level
case law concerning § 1446(b)'s second paragraph.
III. COMPARING THE THREE DISTRICT COURT POSITIONS
As outlined in the introduction, there are three camps among federal dis-
trict courts (and a single federal circuit court) as to when § 1446(b)'s thirty-day
clock should be triggered. A large minority of jurisdictions triggers the thirty-
day clock at the time the plaintiff files a motion to amend the complaint, where
the amended complaint would give rise to federal jurisdiction.3 8 A majority of
jurisdictions (including the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals) requires that the
plaintiffs motion to amend actually be allowed by the state trial court in order
to start the clock.3 9 And a small minority takes the majority's position a step
further in starting the clock to run only upon receipt by the defendant of
is meant to swallow up all the State Constitutions by degrees and this to Swallow by degrees all
the State Judiciaries .... Oh Sweet Candor when wilt thou quit the Cottage and the lisping
infants lip, and shed thy Glory round the Statesman's head.
Diary of William Maclay (Friday, 17 July, 1789), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791: THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY AND OTHER NOTES
ON SENATE DEBATES 116 (Kenneth R. Bowling et a]. eds., 1998).
36 Non-review of remand orders has been an aspect of federal removal jurisdiction since
1887, excepting the period of 1948-1949. See S.L.P., supra note 10, at 88:
An alarming feature of the revised procedure, as originally enacted in 1948, was the total
omission of the rule that a remand order by a federal district court is non-reviewable ....
Apparently, the omission was due to inadvertence, since the amendments of 1949 explicitly
restore the rule.
For treatment of subsequent Supreme Court-created exceptions to the non-review rule, see
Michael E. Solimine, Removal, Remands, and Reforming Federal Appellate Review, 58 Mo.
L. REV. 287 (1993).
37 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(d) (West 2003). For a history and discussion of § 1447(d)'s pro-
scription of remand review, see generally Charles Everingham IV, Removal, Waiver, and the
Myth of Unreviewable Remand in the Fifth Circuit, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 723 (1993); see also
Hrdlick, supra note 11.
38 See, e.g., Harriman v. Liberian Maritime Corp., 204 F. Supp. 205 (D. Mass. 1962); see
also Webster v. Sunnyside Corp., 836 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
39 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Graphic Scanning
v. Yampol, 677 F. Supp. 256 (D. Del. 1988).
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'notice' that indicates the plaintiffs proposed amended complaint has become
an official part of the record.4 °
Each of these three positions takes issue with the details of § 1446(b) and
their application. Section 1446(b)'s second paragraph reads:
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal
may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or
otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper from
which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become remova-
ble, except that a case may not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by
section 1332 of this title more than 1 year after commencement of the action.
4 1
This section will address each of these perspectives by juxtaposing them
to one another, beginning with the first two positions (e.g., the large minority
and the majority), which comprise the actual practice of most federal district
jurisdictions.
A. Large Minority v. Majority
In arguing that the plaintiffs motion to amend itself should trigger
§ 1446(b)'s thirty-day clock, the large minority of federal jurisdictions points to
the plain language of the statute for support. In an older case representative of
the large minority,42 Judge Caffrey held that "Congress did not condition the
running of the twenty [now thirty] day period upon receipt by defendant of
knowledge that a motion had been allowed but, rather, on the receipt by defen-
dant of a document which would bring home to that defendant the fact that
plaintiff had changed his claim . . . ."" Since a motion is included in the
statutory language as a valid trigger, the large minority asserts that the plain
meaning of the statute (evidencing congressional intent) moots the majority's
concern that such an approach forces the defendant to remove prematurely.
4
The majority, on the other hand, contends that an action is not removable
on the basis of a motion to amend until the motion is granted by the state trial
court. As Judge Farnan held:
The State court, by adjudicating the motion in the plaintiffs favor, alters the charac-
ter of the plaintiff's action from a purely state-based cause of action to one involving
a federal basis of jurisdiction. It is only at the time of the state court's ruling that a
party becomes certain of the removability of the case.
45
Until such an order is handed down, argues the majority, there is no basis for
removal, and the federal district court is without valid removal jurisdiction.46
' See, e.g., Miller v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 527 F. Supp. 775 (D. Kan. 1981); see also Finley
v. Higbee Co., I F. Supp. 2d 701 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
4' 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b) (West 2003).
42 Harriman v. Liberian Maritime Corp., 204 F. Supp. 205 (D. Mass. 1962).
43 Id. at 206.
4 See Webster, 836 F. Supp. at 630-31 ("But to accept [the majority's] reading of the stat-
ute is to ignore its clear language - language that does not make the commencement of the
thirty day period conditional on the motion being granted.").
45 Graphic Scanning v. Yampol, 677 F. Supp. 256, 258 (D. Del. 1988).
46 In a rare instance of a circuit court reviewing this issue, Judge Posner reaffirmed the
majority's position:
Until the state judge granted the motion to amend, there was no basis for removal. Until then,
the complaint did not state a federal claim. It might never state a claim, since the state judge
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In asserting a "strict construction" approach, the large minority's logic
breaks down upon further inspection. While a motion to amend may trigger the
thirty-day clock, the latter part of § 1446(b)'s second paragraph states that the
motion will do so only if it indicates that "the case is one which is or has
become removable. '47 The large minority position assumes that a proffered
motion to amend itself triggers removability, where the statute, on its face,
indicates that receipt of a motion starts the removal clock only where the under-
lying action is already, or presently, removable. As Judge Posner held in the
single circuit decision on the issue, "[t]he statutory language [of § 1446(b)]
speaks of a motion or other paper that discloses that the case is or has become
removable, not that it may sometime in the future become removable if some-
thing happens, in this case the granting of a motion by the state judge. 4 s
Such an approach as that advocated by the large minority would invade
the state trial court's responsibility and prerogative to rule on the motion before
it. Once the time to amend of right has passed, amendment generally occurs
only by leave of court. 4 9 However, the large minority would remove such a
might deny the motion... When the motion was granted, the case first became removable... It
would be fantastic to suppose that the time for removing a case could run before the case became
removable[.]
Sullivan, 157 F.3d at 1094. Fantastic or no, a large number of courts so hold.
47 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b) (West 2003) (emphasis added).
48 Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092, 1094 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). Sullivan is
the only circuit decision to directly address the debate over when § 1446(b)'s second para-
graph triggers start the removal clock to run.
While the Tenth Circuit's decision in DeBry v. Transamerica Corp., 601 F.2d 480 (10th
Cir. 1979) addressed the issue regarding when the thirty-day clock is triggered, it did so on
facts that are not helpful to this note's analysis. In DeBry, the plaintiff orally made a motion
to amend the complaint, and the state trial court granted the motion orally, thereby putting
the defendant on notice of its grounds for removal for the first time. Id. at 489. The DeBry
opinion does not inform the reader whether the amended complaint was submitted as part of
the oral motion to amend, and whether the court's order granting amendment included enter-
ing the amendment on the record at that time; the opinion states only that the defendant
removed the action within its thirty-day limit. These missing facts make it impossible to
determine exactly what was meant by the DeBry court's statements in its discussion of the
§1446(b) removal issue:
The plain purpose of § 1446(b) is, then, to permit the removal period to start only after the
defendant is able to ascertain intelligently that the requisites of removability are present. There-
fore, a voluntary motion on the part of the plaintiffs and the trial court's order granting the
motion ought to be sufficient notice within the statute.
Id. at 489.
49 Of course, this rule is governed by state rules while the case remains under the purview of
the state court. However, FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) is the federal system's corollary, and is
representative of state law on the issue:
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course ... before a responsive pleading is
served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has
not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is
served. Otherwise, a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent
of the adverse party[.]
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, within the federal rules themselves, the ability to amend is a
matter of discretion with the court (e.g., "by leave of court"). While the rule goes on to
declare that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires," the discretion to deter-
mine the exigencies of justice resides within the trial court, and such permission is hardly a
[Vol. 4:120
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decision from the state trial court, predicating removal upon the plaintiffs
apparent intent, regardless of the state trial court's disposition on the issue.5 °
The implication of the large minority's position - that the state court's
judgment on a motion to amend is unnecessary, where amendment by right has
expired - flies in the face of fundamental policy concerns driving federal
removal jurisdiction. One of the more unique aspects of the American experi-
ment with a federal government is the concept of concurrent state and federal
judiciaries. In this duality of jurisdiction, the federal judiciary has traditionally
been extremely hesitant to impose on the state trial court's function and auton-
omy.5 1 Justice Stone, writing the opinion of the Supreme Court in Shamrock
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,5 2 considered federal removal jurisdiction in light of
this traditional deference:
[T]he policy of the.., acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts is
one calling for the strict construction of such legislation. The power reserved to the
states under the Constitution to provide for the determination of controversies in their
courts, may be restricted only by the action of Congress in conformity to the Judici-
ary Articles of the Constitution. "Due regard for the rightful independence of state
governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously
confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined."
5 3
foregone conclusion for the plaintiff in either the state or federal judicial systems. See, e.g.,
Hamilton v. Hertz Corp., 607 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D.N.Y. 1985):
Generally, defendant's receipt [of] plaintiffs motion papers requesting leave to amend the
complaint would give sufficient notice that the case may be removable and the thirty-day period
would start to run. However, "the time within which to amend the pleading as of course had
expired and leave of court had to be obtained for such amendment ... Thus, the service of the
motion papers [cannot] serve as the date from which the thirty day period would be measured."
Id. at 1371 (quoting Gibson v. Atl. Coast Line R.R Co., 299 F. Supp. 268, 269 (S.D.N.Y.
1969)).
50 See, e.g., Crump v. Wal-Mart Group Health Plan, 925 F. Supp. 1214, 1218-19 (W.D. Ky.
1996):
[The motion] was not actually filed or made a part of the record until the state court entered its
order dated October 2, 1995. Prior to that time neither a federal claim nor a federal case existed
to be removed. The distinction may seem a technical one but it is important. A defendant cannot
be required to remove a case which does not exist.
... [The plaintiffs] motion requested permission to assert entirely new claims. Until the
state court actually granted the motion, there simply was no case or claim to remove, only specu-
lation about the court's intentions.
51 See Wilson v. Intercollegiate (Big Ten) Conference Athletic Ass'n, 668 F.2d 962, 967
(1982):
[It is] our conviction that the district courts, in interpreting and applying section 1446(b), should
bear in mind, and where possible avoid, the frictions in a harmonious federal system that result
when litigation involving state-law as well as federal-law issues is abruptly shifted into federal
court and the state proceedings, including here a preliminary adjudication on the merits, are set at
naught.
See also Chad Mills, Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis: Harmless Error Applied to Removal Jurisdic-
tion, 35 Hous. L. REV. 601, 618 (1998) ("[R]emoval is an extraordinarily invasive action
that wrests control of a case from a state court without that court's involvement in the pro-
cess. Due to this invasiveness, federal courts have long recognized that the process raises
significant federalism questions.").
52 313 U.S. 100 (1941).
" Id. at 108-09 (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)).
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Out of this federalism-inspired concern that the national respect the local,
it has become axiomatic within the federal judiciary that doubts regarding the
efficacy of removal cut against such removal.54 By forcing defendants to
remove on the basis of a motion to amend, the large minority disregards the
sensitive federalism issues that have traditionally counseled against removal,
and robs the state court system of its most basic authority - that of defining the
scope of a cause of action.
The majority also contends that the large minority's approach injects
uncertainty into the removal process, and inefficiency by association. As Judge
Farnan noted, the large minority's approach "would force a defendant to specu-
late as to the state court's ruling and require a defendant to file his removal
petition before the grounds for removal actually exist."55 By encouraging such
premature removal by defendants - and, more damning, by allowing plaintiffs
to assert that the removal clock has run against unsuspecting defendants - the
large minority undermines the efficiency of both the state and federal court
systems, and subjects all litigants to the threat of increased forum wrangling
and the costs associated therein.5 6 Efficiency arguments will be discussed in
greater detail below.
The minority's approach is both inconsistent with the text of the statute it
purports to strictly construe, and intimates disrespect for the authority of the
state court from whence an action is removed. Such an approach is at odds
with the policy concerns traditionally underpinning removal jurisprudence.
Moreover, the minority position promotes judicial inefficiency, for both state
and federal court systems, and raises the costs of litigation for the parties
involved therein. The majority's position, while imperfect (as discussed
below), is therefore vastly preferable to that of the large minority.
" See, e.g., Zbranek v. Hofheinz, 727 F. Supp. 324, 326 (E.D. Tex. 1989) ("[I]t is the duty
of the federal court reviewing a motion to remand to resolve all doubt in favor of the plaintiff
.. The removal statutes must be strictly construed to protect the states from infringement by
the federal government."); see also Kuns v. Brunswick Corp., 871 F. Supp. 1444, 1446
(N.D. Ga. 1994) ("Removal is a purely statutory right. Accordingly, a court should strictly
construe removal statutes in favor of state court jurisdiction."); People of N.Y. v. Muka, 440
F. Supp. 33, 35 (N.D.N.Y. 1977):
The right to remove a case from a local forum into federal court is solely one conferred by
statute, rather than one which is constitutionally derived ... Inasmuch as the removal statutes
represent Congressionally-authorized encroachments by the federal courts into the various states'
sovereignties, those provisions must be strictly construed, and their established procedures rig-
idly adhered to.
Id. (citations omitted).
" Graphic Scanning v. Yampol, 677 F. Supp. 256, 259 (D. Del. 1988).
56 Ironically, the leading large minority case, Webster, argued that it acted, in part, out of an
attempt to conserve judicial resources. The Webster court asserted that if it were to trigger
the thirty-day clock later than at the motion to amend, and the clock is held by an appellate
court to have run from the motion to amend, that its original jurisdiction on the matter
appealed would be corrupted. "[T]he court is hesitant from the standpoint of judicial econ-
omy to proceed to final judgment in this court only to learn on appeal that there was no
jurisdiction to decide the issues presented by the parties." Webster v. Sunnyside Corp., 836
F. Supp. 629, 631 (S.D. Iowa 1993). It is interesting to note that Congress' proscription of
review of remand but allowance of review of successful removal apparently gives rise to this
fear. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(d) (West 2003).
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B. Majority Position v. Small Minority Position
As stated above, the majority's position is much preferred to that of the
large minority, due in large part to the fact that it avoids the large minority's
great sin of trampling the state court's authority, and the state's sovereignty
thereby. However, the majority's position raises many of the same concerns,
apart from state sovereignty, that make the large minority's position untenable.
And ironically, these concerns result in some of the very inefficiency that the
majority accuses the large minority of fostering.
1. The Shortcomings of the Majority Position
In determining the removal period, the majority triggers the thirty-day
clock at the moment the state trial judge approves a motion to amend. While
this preserves the state court's decision-making voice, the majority's trigger is
premature. Two deficiencies are presented in the majority's approach: first, the
statutory triggers under § 1446(b)'s second paragraph start the removal clock
only where they indicate present removability; second, the area between 'per-
mission to amend' and 'actual amendment' creates a non-uniform gray area
that may result in the practical frustration of removal for the defendant.
In turning to the first of the majority's shortcomings, § 1446(b) requires
that the defendant be either physically present when a state trial judge grants a
plaintiffs motion to amend or that the defendant receive a 'paper' indicating
that the complaint has been amended: section 1446(b) triggers the removal
period upon "receipt by defendant ... of an amended pleading, motion, order,
or other paper [that indicates] that the case is or has become removable."5 7 If
the defendant is in the courtroom when the judge hands down an order, it is
expected that the defendant will receive a copy of the order at that time, thereby
satisfying the statute's receipt requirement. However, if the defendant is not
present for the order's issuance, the statute's removal period is in abeyance
until the defendant receives notice in the form of one of the triggers listed in
§ 1446(b), namely "an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper."
For most of pretrial preparation, a court reviews and decides parties'
motions in camera; even where parties present oral argument for or against
such motions, the court's early decisions in litigation must often occur outside
the presence of the parties involved. The principle flaw with the majority's
argument is that it starts the clock from the court's actual order, and not from
defendant's receipt of information indicating that the plaintiff has acted upon
the court's determination, as required by the statutory language of § 1446(b).
The majority's approach, within its own paradigm, presents a real timing prob-
lem for absent or removed defendants, whose removal period may dissipate
over the course of several days while the court's order is in transit. Even for in-
forum litigants, the loss of a few days' time to evaluate removal may be crucial,
especially for issues involving complicated federal questions.5 8
To rebut such concerns, one could argue that a courtesy copy of a pro-
posed amended complaint is usually (but not always) attached to the motion to
57 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b) (West 2003) (emphasis added).
58 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 712, supra note 30, at 3 (Letter of Deputy Attorney General Kat-
zenbach to the House Committee chair).
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amend served on the defendant, leaving the defendant fully cognizant of the
plaintiff's intentions, should the amendment be allowed. While such practice is
certainly to be desired as a means of promoting communication between litigat-
ing parties, and may very well put a defendant on notice of her grounds for
removal (should the state court grant the motion and the plaintiff act thereon), it
should not legitimize disregard for the removal statute's requirements. First,
such a reading is directly contrary to the statutory language and sets a danger-
ous precedent for statutory interpretation. Second, such an approach forces the
defendant to incur the costs of preparing a removal petition, monitoring the
state court's decision on the motion, and monitoring the plaintiffs filing action
following a favorable order, in addition to possibly preparing an opposition to
plaintiffs motion to amend. For a defendant whose only link to an action is
generally a lawyer who charges by the hour, such monitoring and potentially
needless trial preparation may be extremely expensive and may place additional
burdens on the state court to field such inquiries. Third, where delivery of the
motion, or a subsequent order allowing the motion, has been delayed for
whatever reason, a defendant's period to prepare for removal may be slight
indeed, especially where the plaintiff acts immediately on the order and files an
amended complaint with the state court. The effects of this delay may be exac-
erbated by the availability and time restraints of defendant's counsel. Thus, for
all of the foregoing difficulties, the majority's practice of triggering the
removal clock upon an order that merely creates discretion in the plaintiff to act
is untenable and unworkable.
A proposed order to allow plaintiff's motion to amend presents an interest-
ing spin on the issue, but should fail on the same grounds. Even where the
court itself serves a proposed order on a defendant, including the time at which
the proposed order may become valid, the court is only proposing to allow the
plaintiff to amend her complaint, not informing the defendant that the com-
plaint has been amended.59 Given that the statute requires receipt of a commu-
nication that indicates an action is presently removable ("is or has become
removable"), a proposed order's prospective nature fails to trigger the removal
period.6 °
A second concern raised in the majority's position concerns the state
court's approach to amendment generally. Both the large minority and the
majority assume that a motion to amend (granted or pending) is tantamount to
actual amendment, where it may very well not be.61 A plaintiff who asks for
(minority position) - and even receives (majority position) - permission to
amend a complaint may choose not to act upon the court's permission, depend-
" But cf Gibson v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 299 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (triggering
the removal clock from the defendant's receipt of a proposed order).
I If, by operation of postal delay or administrative error, a defendant should receive a
proposed order after its proposed date of effect, and the court amended plaintiffs complaint
on the proposed date of effect, such a notice would seem to qualify under the statute's
'presently removable' requirement. However, the relevant question is: has the defendant
been informed that plaintiff's amended complaint has been entered on the record? Here,
notice of a proposed order - even after its proposed effective date - does not communicate
that information (e.g., actual entry of the amended complaint into the litigation record); con-
sequently, the removal clock is not triggered.
61 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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ing on the practice rules of the state in which the plaintiff brings her litigation.
In Miller v. Stauffer Chemical Co. ,62 Judge O'Connor noted that such scenarios
"encourage defendants to seek removal before the filing of an amended com-
plaint to avoid forfeiting their right to remove even though such a complaint
might never be filed."6 3
By raising the possibility of federal removal jurisdiction, a plaintiff may
be testing the waters to see whether the defendant will rise to the bait of a
federal forum and remove the contest. If such a removal is attempted, and state
procedure vests the plaintiff with discretion (or even final responsibility) to
submit the amendment for inclusion in the record, the plaintiff may use non-
filing as a weapon to force remand. The plaintiff may maintain that permission
to amend alone was sought, and that she simply chose not to act upon the
court's permission. Since the plaintiff has not actually altered the substantive
character of the action on the record, such an argument would seem to consti-
tute valid grounds for remand. 64 In such forum-selection shenanigans; the
plaintiff could both feel out the defendant's removal inclinations and defeat any
such attempts to remove, at the cost of judicial efficiency and additional
expense to all involved.
Such scenarios raise additional questions: once the case has been
remanded in such a situation as that described above, would the large minority/
majority positions reset the thirty-day removal clock? If yes, then the threat of
future attempts to amend, and their associated costs, could be endlessly on the
horizon for all would-be removed defendants, at least where federal question
jurisdiction is involved. 65 If no, then the plaintiff may exhaust the thirty-day
clock on a decoy motion to amend, and then advance the true motion after the
removal clock has expired. While a defendant may seek Rule 11 sanctions66
against the plaintiff for such conduct, this recourse represents cold comfort for
a defendant without the desire, means, and/or time to pursue such litigation,
even assuming such sanctionable conduct could be proven.
While it is hallowed tradition in both state and federal court that the
"plaintiff is master of the complaint," the advantages apparently secured to the
plaintiff by both the large minority and the majority positions are both wasteful
and disruptive to the processes of justice. By starting the removal clock to run
before the defendant receives notice of a court's order on a motion to amend
and the plaintiffs subsequent actions thereon, the majority promotes either
constant monitoring of the court's activities or premature removal by defend-
62 527 F. Supp. 775 (D. Kan. 1981).
63 Id. at 777 (emphasis added).
I See, e.g., Air Ill., Inc. v. Approved Aircraft Accessories, Inc., 1986 WL 12808 (N.D. Ill.
1986) ("it is well established that the propriety of a removal petition is 'established on the
basis of the record as it stands at the time the petition for removal is filed."') (quoting Nu-
Way Systems of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Belmont Mktg., 635 F.2d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 1980)).
65 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b) (West 2003) (where removal is based on diversity jurisdic-
tion, a one-year limit on removal exists, beginning from the commencement of the action by
service of summons or the complaint).
66 FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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ants anxious to avoid forfeiting a federal forum.6 7 While the majority is prefer-
able to the large minority for its respect of state trial courts and their
jurisdiction, the two positions fail equally in that they waste judicial resources
and make the litigation process unpredictable, expensive, and prolonged for
litigants, as well as the state and federal court systems in which they present
their contest.
2. The Advantages of the Small Minority Position
In order to address such economical and procedural concerns, a small
minority (which could be fairly considered a subset of the majority)68 has taken
the majority approach one step further. The small minority starts the thirty-day
clock running only upon receipt by the defendant of some form of notice from
the state trial court that the plaintiff has been granted permission to amend her
complaint, and that the amended complaint has been entered into the court's
record.
Such an approach gives maximum deference to the processes of the state
trial court, since it triggers the thirty-day clock only following the state court's
decision on the amendment petition. In addition, the small minority position
improves the removal process by making the basis of removal certain, predicat-
ing removal on a verifiable, presently amended complaint. This approach con-
serves judicial resources by discouraging improvident or premature removal,
since the removal period is triggered by the much more sure and reliable event
of actual amendment and subsequent notice of that fact. As a result, the small
minority approach reduces the costs of litigation for both plaintiff and defen-
67 One federal district court encouraged defendants to remove on less-than-certain grounds
in order to avoid the risk of an expired removal clock. In McGraw v. Lyons, 863 F. Supp.
430, 433 n.8 (W.D. Ky. 1994), the court noted:
The defendant in [another case] took the course of action that this court recommends ... in
the face of indeterminate pleadings ... the defendant filed a notice of removal promptly, within
the thirty-day limit required by § 1446(b). The Court remanded the case, but significantly, noted
that if [grounds for removal] emerged later, the second paragraph of § 1446(b) would apply,
giving the defendant thirty days after receipt of the amended pleadings to file for removal ...
Thus, defendants who petition for removal promptly are protected if the plaintiff later changes
the claim because § 1446(b) gives such defendants another thirty-day window of opportunity to
remove.
Id. (emphasis added). While the court's dicta applies specifically to the interchange between
§ 1446(b)'s first and second paragraphs, such a course of conduct would seem to also be the
"safest" for a defendant facing a motion to amend. Such defensive procedural posturing by
the defendant is surely inconsonant with congressional intent to make removal predictable
and efficient.
Note that this court seems to side with the small minority, since it would start the clock
"after receipt of the amended pleading." Id. Interestingly, the case that the McGraw court is
describing, Cole v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 728 F. Supp. 1305 (E.D. Ky. 1990),
made no specific reference to what action would trigger the removal clock; the McGraw
court voiced its own opinion on the polemic of the removal clock's trigger.
68 Indeed, in examining the issue, some commentators have erroneously combined the
majority and the small minority positions. See, e.g., Ellen Relkin, The Sword or the Shield:
Use of Governmental Regulations, Exposure Standards and Toxicological Data in Toxic
Tort Litigation, 6 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 21 (1997) ("The majority, on the other
hand, holds that the 30-day removal period begins to run only after the motion to amend has
been granted and the amended complaint has been served." (emphasis added)).
[Vol. 4:120
TRIGGERING THE TIME BOMB
dant and streamlines judicial proceedings to promote a more timely conclusion
of litigation.
Both the large minority and the majority might assert that the small minor-
ity's position reads "motion" and "order" out of the statute altogether, leaving
only "amended pleading" or "other paper" as valid triggers. In rebutting this
assertion, it is useful to note that the statute does not indicate that state action
alone qualifies a matter for removal; rather, the statute requires that the defen-
dant receive a "copy" of some sort of written notice, indicating that the case is
"one which is or has become removable."6 9 As a result, incorporating the
amendment into the record, without also informing the defendant after the fact
of this action by way of one of the papers contemplated in the statute, does not
trigger the thirty-day clock. The small minority does not read 'motion' and
'order' out of the statute, but rather considers these two triggers inapposite
where amendment triggers the thirty-day clock. A state court order granting a
plaintiffs motion to dismiss a non-diverse party from a suit may trigger the
removal clock when the order is given in the defendant's presence or after-
wards received by the defendant.7 ° Similarly, a motion that amounts to a judi-
cial admission may compromise the plaintiff's choice of forum and trigger the
removal clock upon defendant's receipt of such a motion. In both instances,
the small minority's read of § 1446(b) leaves the triggers of "motion" and
"order" intact, where they indicate to a defendant that an action "is or has
become removable.'
69 Here, the author assumes that the communication must generally be a writing: the fourth
trigger listed reads "or other paper," indicating that the foregoing are some sort of "paper."
While beyond the pale of this Note, there is presently much varied (and sometimes conflict-
ing) innovation in defining the term "other paper" to include other communications. Under
this heading, judicial admissions stemming from depositions and interrogatories have trig-
gered the thirty-day clock, especially where the prospective federal jurisdiction will be based
on diversity. While such depositions are not technically "paper" or a "writing," they are part
of the court's record, and, as such, might be conceptually defined as a "writing" for
§ 1446(b)'s purposes. See, e.g., Jong v. Gen. Motors Corp., 359 F. Supp. 223, 226 (D.C.
Cal. 1973) ("the time period to remove an action cannot depend on defendant's actual
knowledge, because the statute expressly allows a defendant to rely on papers presented to
it."); but cf Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Removal of Diversity Actions When the Amount in
Controversy Cannot Be Determined From the Face of Plaintiff's Complaint: The Need for
Judicial and Statutory Reform to Preserve Defendant's Equal Access to Federal Courts, 62
Mo. L. REV. 681 (1997) (discussing current split among federal courts regarding whether
defendant has an affirmative duty to investigate an ambiguous ad damnum clause); see also
Camden Indus. Co. v. Carpenters Local Union, 246 F. Supp. 252 (D.N.H. 1965) (informal
answers to interrogatories are "other paper" and may trigger removal period); Fisher v.
United Airlines, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (oral examination as "other paper");
Eyak Native Vill. v. Exxon Corp., 25 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff's reply to defen-
dant's answer constitutes other paper); Gilardi v. Atchinson, 189 F. Supp. 82 (D. I11. 1960)
(deposition held as other paper); but S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489 (5th
Cir. 1996) (defendant's affidavit of telephone conversation with plaintiff does not constitute
"other paper" because it results from defendant's own actions).
70 See, e.g., DeBry v. Transamerica Corp., 601 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1979) ("[T]he oral
motion [to amend] of plaintiffs and the trial court's oral order granting the motion [to
amend], on the record, certainly must be that sufficient notice with which the statute is
concerned.").
7' 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b) (West 2003) (emphasis added).
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IV. FURTHER CONSIDERTION OF STATUTORY INTENT AND LEGITIMACY
In reviewing the foregoing arguments, one might consider the possibility
that the three approaches to § 1446(b)'s second paragraph are nothing more
than the result of imprecise statutory language and hardly deserving of more
exhaustive inquiry. However, beyond the small minority's claims to superior
efficiency and logical statutory construction, the small minority may also claim
consonance with a half-century of legislative intent driving §1446(b) and its
development, as well as with the Supreme Court's latest word on the nature of
legitimate jurisdiction and removal.
A. Congressional Intent and the Small Minority
In refuting the large minority and the majority's approaches to triggering
the removal clock, this note argues that only the small minority's approach to
removal both respects the state court's prerogatives and adequately conserves
judicial resources. But beyond these benevolent attributes - and of greater
moment - the small minority's approach is most faithful to the plain language
of § 1446(b), as illustrated in Part III above, and best satisfies the congressional
intent behind this statute, as illustrated below.
Again, in divining the congressional will behind § 1446(b)'s second para-
graph, we look initially to the statute's first paragraph. The time limitations for
both removal periods have been paired with one another since the second para-
graph's advent in 1949; when Congress amended § 1446 in 1965, it continued
this parity by expanding the removal clock for both removal scenarios to thirty
days. Congress' avowed purposes in the 1948 codification of removal, and its
subsequent development, have been to create predictability in the area of
removal and to ensure that the defendant has adequate notice of an action's
nature to effect timely removal.72 As stated in the Senate Report accompany-
ing the 1949 amendment of § 1446(b), Congress was concerned that the defen-
dant would be placed "in the position of having to take steps to remove a suit to
Federal court before he knows what the suit is about."7 3
Under the small minority approach, a motion to amend is of no conse-
quence until the state court has spoken to the substance of the motion and the
plaintiff has responded accordingly. To start the clock prior to actual amend-
ment is to potentially force (and certainly encourage) the defendant to remove
before he has had adequate time to determine if grounds for removal exist.
Under the large minority and majority approach, the defendant is forced to
remove either prior to actual amendment or within a significantly-reduced
removal period, or he forfeits that option. In either scenario, congressional
intent to grant defendant adequate time to determine the basis for removal is
compromised, at best.
In approaching removal, Congress has tried to balance the interests of the
plaintiff, defendant, and court.7 4 In 1988, in an attempt to end disruptive and
72 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
71 S. REP. No. 303, at 6 (1949).
74 See, e.g., Meade, supra note 9, at 493:
The concept of removal presents itself when the plaintiff could have filed the lawsuit in
federal court but selected a state court instead. The plaintiff may do so for many reasons: to take
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late-game removals, Congress amended the second paragraph of § 1446(b) to
proscribe diversity-jurisdiction removal attempted by the defendant more than
one year after an action has commenced.75 Congress indicated, at that time,
that its intent was to avoid removal where significant judicial effort and
resources have been invested in an action at the state trial-court level, and the
duplication of the trial's development in federal court would be wasteful.76
Indeed, Congress' very intent to codify removal procedure belied the intent to
standardize a process that varied greatly from forum to forum.7 7 The driving
force behind this desire for standardization was to promote conservative and
efficient use of judicial resources.7 8 Both the majority and large minority posi-
tions undermine this efficiency by forcing a defendant to second-guess the
court's determination on a plaintiff's motion to amend; such uncertainty is
prone to elevate judicial and litigious waste through unnecessary monitoring of
a motion's status and/or forcing the defendant to remove an action prematurely,
resulting in an unreviewable remand. Such an outcome is inconsonant with the
manifest intent of Congress to balance and preserve the interests of all parties at
the litigation table.
Under both the large minority and the majority's approach to the removal
clock, a defendant is forced to remove a case on something other than the basis
of the plaintiffs complaint-of-record; 7 9 these approaches would leave removal
jurisprudence on a shaky foundation. Only where the plaintiffs complaint is
explicitly defined and a part of the court's record may the defendant avoid
improvident removal and benefit from the congressional intent underlying
§ 1446(b): to standardize removal procedure. The small minority's position
best enables the defendant to avoid being forced to "remove a suit to Federal
court before he [or she] knows what the suit is about,"8 and best furthers Con-
gress' intent to economize the court's resources.
B. Murphy Brothers and § 1446(b)'s Second Paragraph
In Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.8 1 the Supreme
Court addressed § 1446(b)'s first paragraph and the statutory removal period
for an action that is initially removable. Its decision thereon logically extends
to a discussion of second-paragraph removal 82 Since the 1949 amendment of
the statute, lower federal courts had split on the issue of whether receipt of a
courtesy copy of a complaint alone triggered the removal clock (the "receipt
rule") or whether formal service upon the defendant was required to commence
advantage of jury bias; to avoid federal judges who may have more experience applying federal
law; to inconvenience the defendant by making him travel to a remote state court, etc. To
counteract these advantages, Congress allows a defendant to remove a civil action filed in state
court to federal court if the requirements of either § 1331 or § 1332 are satisfied.
(emphasis added).
71 Diversity-jurisdiction removal is codified in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 2003).
76 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
77 Revision Notes, 1948 Act, in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b) (West 2003).
78 Id.
79 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
80 S. REP. No. 303, at 6 (1949).
81 526 U.S. 344 (1999).
82 For a broad discussion of the background history of Murphy, see Meade, supra note 9.
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the thirty-day period.83 The Murphy Brothers Court, per Justice Ginsburg,
invalidated the receipt rule and held that formal service alone triggered
§ 1446(b)'s first paragraph removal clock.8 4 The Court based its decision on
the "bedrock principle" that "an individual . . . is not obliged to engage in
litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court's authority by
formal process. '"85 After reviewing the legislative history of §1446, the Court
determined that Congress did not intend to change the formal notification
requirement with respect to removal triggers.8 6
The Court then examined the four possible scenarios of service contem-
plated under § 1446,87 and determined that all of them provide the defendant
with at least thirty days to determine the removability of an action. The court
noted that to interpret the § 1446(b) clock to run only upon formal service
"adheres to tradition, makes sense of the phrase 'or otherwise,' and assures
defendants adequate time to decide whether to remove an action to federal
court.
' 8 8
While Murphy Brothers specifically addresses the first paragraph of
§ 1446(b) and the process by which a court secures initial jurisdiction over an
individual, the Court's analysis is relevant in considering discussion of
§ 1446(b)'s second paragraph as well. First, the fact that the trigger language
in the two paragraphs is identical intuitively links their consideration.89 In
expounding the Court's opinion in Murphy Brothers, Justice Ginsburg noted
that the initial pleading had to be formally served to satisfy the "through service
or otherwise" language of § 1446(b)'s first paragraph, rejecting the appellate
court's assertion that the "or otherwise" language authorized informal service,
such as that formerly sanctioned by the receipt rule.9" The Court's reinforce-
ment of the service requirement, in tandem with discounting the "or otherwise"
83 See generally D. Troy Blair, Receipt of a Complaint, Prior to or Unattended By Formal
Service of Process, Does Not Trigger a Defendant's Thirty-Day Period to Remove A Case:
Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 38 DUQ. L. REV. 663 (2000).
84 Murphy Brothers, 526 U.S. at 350-51.
85 Id. at 347.
86 Id. at 352-53:
Nothing in the legislative history of the 1949 amendment so much as hints that Congress, in
making changes to accommodate atypical state commencement and complaint filing procedures,
intended to dispense with the historic function of service of process as the official trigger for
responsive action by an individual or entity named defendant.
87 Id. at 354-55:
First, if the summons and complaint are served together, the 30-day period for removal runs at
once. Second, if the defendant is served with the summons but the complaint is furnished to the
defendant sometime after, the period for removal runs from the defendant's receipt of the com-
plaint. Third, if the defendant is served with the summons and the complaint is filed in court, but
under local rules, service of the complaint is not required, the removal period runs from the date
the complaint is made available through filing. [Fourth], if the complaint is filed in court prior to
any service, the removal period runs from the service of summons.
The Court borrows these categories from Potter v. McCauley, 186 F. Supp. 146, 149 (D. Md.
1960).
88 Murphy Brothers, 526 U.S. at 354.
89 Both paragraphs state that a notice of removal is to be filed "within thirty days after the
receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of [the triggering paper]."
28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b) (West 2003).
90 Murphy Brothers, 526 U.S. at 353-56.
[Vol. 4:120
TRIGGERING THE TIME BOMB
language, surely qualifies a reading of the second paragraph and indicates
which means of communicating present removability are to be preferred, where
the statutory language is identical as between the two paragraphs.
Second, the nature of removability would seem to link the interpretation of
the two paragraphs. Section 1446(b)'s second paragraph contemplates a scena-
rio where the plaintiff has so crafted her complaint that she is immunized from
removal, but her subsequent actions have so changed the complaint that it is
now fairly considered a new litigation, one that qualifies for federal jurisdic-
tion.91 If the action is a "new litigation," as asserted, it-follows that a "new
service of process," or an analogous notice from the state trial court, should
issue to alert the defendant that he should be on guard from a new offensive.
Where a plaintiff so changes the nature of an action that it becomes a new
action, thereby reviving removal, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Murphy
Brothers would seem to require state trial court notification of the changed
circumstances, regardless of the previous proceedings before the court.
The third reason to apply Murphy Brothers to a discussion of § 1446(b)'s
second paragraph springs from the common underlying purpose that Congress
has given to § 1446(b)'s two paragraphs: to provide the defendant with uniform
and adequate time to intelligently determine removal, while restricting unlim-
ited access to that option. In finding that Congress did not intend to abrogate
the service of summons process, the Court based its decision largely on Con-
gress' intent to afford a defendant adequate time to determine the viability of
removal, opining that it is fundamentally unjust to allow a defendant's removal
period to expire without first providing the defendant with an opportunity to
remove. 92 Although a courtesy copy of the complaint may indeed put the
defendant on notice of the plaintiff's intended litigation, the Court would predi-
cate the defendant's removal options on the surer footing of actual communica-
tion from the trial court. 93 The Murphy Brothers Court viewed such an
approach as the best way to preserve and safeguard the § 1446(b) first para-
graph removal period, consciously acting to effectuate Congress' intent to
objectify the removal clock.94 With little effort, the same logic extends to
§ 1446(b)'s second paragraph triggers.
91 See Wilson v. Intercollegiate (Big Ten) Conference Athletic Ass'n, 668 F.2d 962, 965
(7th Cir. 1982) (section 1446(b)'s second paragraph revives removal "where the plaintiff
files an amended complaint that so changes the nature of his action as to constitute 'substan-
tially a new suit begun that day'") (quoting Fletcher v. Hamlet, 116 U.S. 408, 410 (1886)).
92 See, e.g., Murphy Brothers, 526 U.S. at 356, where the Court indicates its dissatisfaction
with one of the effects of the receipt rule: "Furthermore, the so-called 'receipt rule' - starting
the time to remove on receipt of a copy of the complaint, however informally, despite the
absence of any formal service - could, as the District Court recognized, operate with notable
unfairness to individuals and entities in foreign nations."
93 Id.
9' See id. at 351, 354:
Congress soon recognized, however, that § 1446(b), as first framed, did not "give adequate time
and operate uniformly" in all States.... To ensure that the defendant would have access to the
complaint before commencement of the removal period, Congress in 1949 enacted the current
version of § 1446(b) . . . . The interpretation of § 1446(b) adopted here adheres to tradition,
makes sense of the phrase 'or otherwise,' and assures defendants adequate time to decide
whether to remove an action to federal court.
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In consideration of the foregoing discussion, it would appear that Murphy
Brothers has much more application in interpreting § 1446(b)'s second para-
graph than might appear at first blush. Such application suggests that the small
minority's approach is most consonant with this latest word from the Supreme
Court on the subject of obtaining legitimate jurisdiction over removed court
proceedings, given that the small minority's approach provides a more reliable
means of communicating present removability and best effectuates the congres-
sional intent to provide the defendant with adequate time to consider the deci-
sion to remove.
V. CONCLUSION
From its stormy inception in the Constitutional Convention and its trau-
matic birth in the First Congress, the federal judiciary has been eyed with more
than a little suspicion by states and their courts and accused of a design to
displace local government, principally local judiciaries. Proponents of the fed-
eral courts have argued for two centuries that such claims are unfounded, and
that plaintiffs and defendants should have access to a forum devoid (or at least
significantly purged) of local prejudices. By creating concurrent federal courts,
such a forum was made available to all who met certain requirements imposed
by Congress.
However, the great majority of cases that become removable by way of
one of the statutory triggers of § 1446(b) endanger the actual availability of that
forum for the defendant. First, by interfering with the state trial court's juris-
diction, the large minority disregards the federalism concerns that have ever
plagued the federal judiciary, thereby aggravating the tension extant between
the states and the federal government. Second, by giving the plaintiff appar-
ently unlimited ability to defeat removal, both the majority and the large minor-
ity defeat one of the principle purposes of the federal district courts: to allow
the defendant to remove an action to a federal court free of actual or perceived
bias. In addition, predictability in the law and its procedure, that axiomatic
aspiration of both legislature and judiciary, is done a great disservice in the
large minority and majority positions. Only the small minority's approach to
triggering § 1446(b)'s removal clock alleviates federalism concerns inherent in
the American experience, preserves the federal forum for qualified defendants,
and effectuates the legislative intent to promote judicial efficiency and fairness
in the removal process.
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